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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a stochastic pricing model of a unique, path-dependent lease instrument
common in the United Kingdom and numerous commonwealth countries, the upward-only adjusting
lease. In this lease, the rental rate is fixed at lease commencement but will be reset to the market rate
at predetermined intervals (usually every five years) if it exceeds the contract rent. Numerical results
indicate how the initial coupon rate should be set relative to that on a symmetric up-and-downward
adjusting “variable rate" lease under various economic conditions (level of real interest rates and
expected drift and volatility of the underlying rental service flow). We also consider the calculation
of effective rents when free rent periods are given during either a market collapse or a steady-state
drift.
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Valuing lease contracts from a real options perspective is well developed. For example,
Grenadier (1995), using an endogenously derived term-structure for lease rates, determines
the equilibrium lease rates for many dierent types of leases under various economic assump-
tions. In this paper, we utilize the concepts of market equilibrium relationships among lease
rates in development of a model for valuing securities with path-dependent cash 
ows. We
apply this model to an interesting commercial lease contract known as the upward-only
adjustable lease.
The upward-only adjustable lease is a common commercial lease contract in the
UK and other former commonwealth countries, such as Australia and New Zealand (Baum
and Sams, 1990). In this lease, the rental rate is xed for an extended term (formerly 25
years, but now 15 years) at lease commencement, but the lessor has the option to have the
rent reset to the market rate at predetermined intervals (every ve years). If market rents
increase, then the contract rent will increase to the market level. If market rents decline, the
rent remains at the previous level. Valuing this type of contract is quite complex because
the contract rate at subsequent adjustment dates depends upon previous adjustments -
introducing a path dependency problem. We derive an implicit equation for valuing the
lease, and use it to compute the initial rents for a variety of leases with a given term
that have the same values, as competition for space would require. The key is using the
probability function of a stochastic variable to derive an explicit relationship between the
expected market rents at the adjustment dates and the initial contract rent.
In Section 2, we utilize the Grenadier model to compute the lease rates on 5, 10, and
15 year xed-rate leases at ve year intervals 15 years into the future. These rental rates
are based on assumptions regarding the service 
ow generated by the underlying asset. The
model for pricing the upward-only adjusting lease relative to an up-or-downward adjusting
lease is described in Section 3.
In Section 4, we use the results of Sections 2 and 3 to price the upward-only adjusting
lease for dierent assumed levels of real interest rates and the expected drift (in
ation rate)
and volatility in the asset service 
ow. The impact of alternative adjustment indices is also
illustrated. Section 5 introduces time dependency in the drift and illustrates this in the
context of pricing at the onset of a market collapse where real rents are expected to decline
for the rst ve years and then spike back up to the zero real growth trend line during
the second ve years. Section 6 analyzes the impact of free rent periods on the setting of
contract rents and illustrates how one should compute eective rent from face rent when
free rent periods are given. A summary concludes the paper.
32 Equilibrium Term-Structure of Lease Rents
We begin with the standard view that leasing is the process by which a property owner
sells the use of an asset for a specied period to a lessee who promises to make payments
over this lease term. This is the standard assumption for lease valuation following Miller
and Upton (1976), McConnell and Schallheim (1983), Schallheim and McConnell (1985),
and Grenadier (1995, 1996). As Grenadier (1996) points out, leasing separates property
ownership from property use where the lessor receives the lease payments and the residual
property value while the lessee receives the use of the property over the lease term. This
economic model allows us to value the lease contract in an equilibrium context where the
lease payments compensate the lessor for the loss of use of the property. The equilibrium
context implies that, in an ecient market, all leases with the same maturity should provide
the same present value to the lessor, irrespective of whether the rental rate is xed, fully
variable, or partially variable.
Rather than rely on traditional arbitrage arguments from option pricing models, we
follow Grenadier (1996) and use a general equilibrium model, which relaxes the tradability
assumptions required in arbitrage pricing. This assumption is appealing when modeling
property leasing markets where the underlying asset is subject to signicant transaction
costs, is relatively indivisible, and cannot be sold short.
The demand for the use of a leased property is derived from its potential use as an
economic input. As a result, the value of the lease depends upon the value of the asset
service 
ow over the lease term. We assume that the value of an asset's service 
ow, S(t;!)
varies randomly in time t.1 For simplicity we assume a risk{neutral equilibrium model
where all assets are priced to yield the expected (deterministic) risk{free rate of return
r(t). Grenadier (1995) notes that this restriction can be relaxed by incorporating a risk
premium into the drift rate in the manner of Cox and Ross (1976). We introduce the
notation ~ r(t) =
Z t
0
r()d. Because leasing an asset is equivalent to purchasing its use for
a specied time, T, then, as Grenadier (1996) shows, the value of the lease contract given
the value of the service 
ow at origination, S0 is
Y (S0;0;T) = ES0
Z T
0
e ~ r(t)St dt: (1)
Here ES0 denotes the expectation given (conditioned on) S0, where S0 is the value of the
asset's service 
ow at contract origination (t = 0). Below, this subscript is omitted, but
when the value of the lease contract is calculated, the expected value is understood as in
(1).
1The argument ! selects the random realization of the value function; ! is suppressed hereafter, so that
we refer only to S(t).
4In this paper, we assume that the risk{free interest rate r is a constant, so that
~ r(t) = rt. We also assume that the value of the asset's service 
ow obeys the stochastic
dierential equation
dS(t) = S(t)dt + S(t)dw(t); (2)
where w(t) denotes the standard Brownian motion, and the instantaneous drift coecient,
, and the instantaneous volatility, , are given constants. (In Section 5 we generalize our
discussion to the case when the drift is a deterministic function of time.)
The solution to (2) is the stochastic process given by








where ES(t) = S0et. (Eq.(3) can be veried by directly applying the It^ o formula.) The
service 
ow is the source of the asset's underlying economic value that evolves over time and
based on (3) is log{normal distributed. The stochastic process used here has the 
exibility
to capture a variety of economic conditions, including a positive or negative drift in demand.
The expected drift will depend on expected in
ation, the expected growth rate in the driver
of the demand for space (e.g., nancial services employment for oce) and expectations of
how supply will adjust to demand growth.2
In an ecient rental market, the xed level lease payments, set at origination, must
equal the expected value of the asset's service 
ow over the lease term. Thus the contract
rent, Rf(0), set at origination is dened by the equation
Y (S0;0;T) = Rf(0)E
Z T
0
e ~ r(t) dt: (4)
Using equations (1)   (4), the equilibrium rent on a xed-rent lease at origination





where g(:;:;:) is the continuous time present value annuity function. The present value of
a dollar stream between t1 and t2 is
g(a;t1;t2) 
(
(e at1   e at2)=a if a 6= 0
t2   t1 if a = 0
:
2For estimates of the relationship of U.K. rental rates to such factors, see Hendershott, MacGregor and
White (2000).
5Table 1 presents the contract rents of various term xed-rent leases found using the
standard Grenadier term-structure framework.3 In these and all calculations, S0 is normal-
ized to unity. Rents are computed for two dierent real interest rate (r   ) environments
{ 1% and 4% { and three dierent expected service 
ow growth rates () { 0%, 5%, and
10%. We present the xed-rents for a standard 15-year lease assuming that the lease is
originated in years 0, 5, and 10. To demonstrate the term-structure of lease rates, we also
report the expected rent on a 10-year lease originated in year 5 and a series of 5-year leases
originated in years 0, 5, and 10. Rents are higher for high expected service 
ow growth
rates and decline as real interest rates increase. And the greater the expected service 
ow
growth rate, the greater is the rent on a longer term xed-rent lease relative to that on a
shorter-term xed-rent lease (compare the 5-, 10-, and 15-year lease rates at year ve).
3 The Upward-Only Adjusting Lease
We now analyze the case of the upward-only adjusting lease contract. Consider a 3T{year
lease where at T and 2T, the rent is adjusted to the then market rent, if and only if the
market rent at T and 2T is higher than the previous contract rent.4 We use u(t) to
denote the stochastic `market' upward-only adjusting rent at time t and Ru(0) to denote
the equilibrium `contract' rent at origination for an upward-only lease with two adjustments
where the rst adjustment occurs at T. Furthermore, we denote the `contract' rents at
the adjustment dates as Ru(T) and Ru(2T).5 Thus, at origination u(T) and u(2T) are
unknown.
The rent at each adjustment is set in line with the market rent on a new upward-only
adjusting lease with the same term as the initial lease. Thus, the market rent at T is the
expected equilibrium rent on a 3T{year lease originated at T, which has two upward-only
adjustments, and the market rent at 2T is the expected equilibrium rent on a 3T{year
upward-only adjusting lease also with two adjustments originated at 2T.
Using the equilibrium condition that the present value of the expected rental stream
over the term of the lease must equal the expected value of the service 
ow from the property
3This framework abstracts from such complications as vacancies or nonrenewals. Such complications
would require that short-term leases rates be higher than long-term lease rates to compensate for down time
and lease up expenses.
4Baum and Sams (1990) discuss the adjustment feature of the upward-only lease and illustrate a simplistic
approach to valuing this lease by computing the present value of the expected adjusted rents. Baum,
Mackmin and Nunnington (1989) illustrate the simplistic present value method for valuing the upward-only
contract in a number of examples, but they do not discuss the rent review process.
5Note that we use the superscript, u, to denote the rent on the upward-only lease, the superscript, f,
to denote the rent on a xed-rent lease, and no superscript when referring to an up-or-downward adjusting
lease.
6over the lease term, the initial contract rent must balance the following equation:











Ru(T) = E [max[Ru(0);u(T)]] (7)
and
Ru(2T) = E [max[Ru(T);u(2T)]]: (8)
Note the path dependency problem: the future rental rates needed to solve for the current
rental rate themselves depend on the current rental rate.
The market rent, u(T) in (7), is the equilibrium rent on a new 3T{year upward-only
lease at T and is determined by
Y (ST;T;4T) = u(T)
Z 2T
T
e rtdt + ^ u(2T)
Z 3T
2T




where ^ u and ^ ^ u denote the future upward-only adjusting rents conditional upon the market
rent at T and as before,
^ u(2T) = E
h




^ u(3T) = E
h
max[ ^ u(2T); ^ ^ u(3T)]
i
: (11)
By the same logic, the market rent, u(2T) in (8), is the equilibrium rent on an
3T{year upward-only lease at 2T that has a value of Y (S2T;2T;5T). Because the contract
rent adjusts to future market rents on upward-only contracts with the same length term,
rather than a term equal to the remaining life of the lease, the solution requires solving an
innite system.
Baum, Beardsley, and Ward (1999) have suggested using Monte Carlo simulations
of the market rental index to price the upward-only adjustments. It is not clear, however,
how this method correctly accounts for the embedded adjustments in future rental rates.
Furthermore, their model does not specify the relationship between market rents, benets
derived from utilizing the space (the service 
ow), and asset value.
We close the system by modeling the `market-rent' index as a series of `xed-rent'
contracts rather than upward-only adjusting contracts. Thus, consider a 3T{year lease with
7upward{only adjustments at times T and 2T to the market `xed-rent' on a 3T{year lease.
The market rent at T, given the value of the asset's service 
ow S(T), is given by
(T) = S0e 2T=2+w(T)g(r   ;T;4T)=g(r;T;4T) (12)
and the market rent at 2T, given the value of the service 
ow S(2T), is given by
(2T) = S0e 22T=2+w(2T)g(r   ;2T;5T)=g(r;2T;5T): (13)
The initial equilibrium contract rent Ru(0) is a constant that satises the equation
Y (S0;0;3T) = Ru(0)g(r;0;T) + Ru(T)g(r;T;2T) + Ru(2T)g(r;2T;3T) (14)
where
Ru(T)  E [max[Ru(0);(T)]] (15)
and
Ru(2T)  E [max[Ru(T);(2T)]]: (16)
The path dependency problem still exists: Ru(2T) is dependent upon Ru(T) and
both are dependent upon Ru(0), which is the unknown we solve for in equation (14). The
Appendix shows, using the probability function of a stochastic variable, how to make Ru(2T)
and Ru(T) explicit functions of Ru(0), so that equation (14) fully accounts for these depen-
dencies.6
4 Base Numerical Results
Using equations (12) and (13) we evaluate the expected values in (15) and (16), and then
solve (14) numerically for the initial contract rent, Ru(0), and the expected rents at the
two adjustment dates for a 15-year upward-only adjusting lease with adjustments at years
5 and 10. These are given in columns (5)   (7) of Table 2. Column (4) shows the present
value of the lease contract. For comparison, we calculate the expected rents for a 15-year,
up-or-down adjusting lease (columns (8)   (10)). The up-or-down adjusting rents in years
6Equation (14) is readily generalized to a nT-year upward-only adjusting lease with (n  1) adjustments
at time intervals of length T.









Note that adjustment rents are based on a constant 15-year term. The expected rent at
origination is the constant that satises the equation:
Y (S0;0;15) = R(0)g(r;0;5) + E(5)g(r;5;10) + E(10)g(r;10;15) (19)
In columns (11)   (13), we report the dierence between the upward-only rents and the
up-or-down rents.
The numerical results show the impact of changes in the real risk-free interest rate, r 
, the expected growth in the service 
ow, , and the service 
ow volatility, . We examine
the rental rates in low ( = 0:1) and high ( = 0:2) service 
ow volatility regimes. The
dierences between the initial rents for the two contracts indicates the discount necessary to
compensate the tenant for the 
oor on rents caused by the upward-only adjustment clause.
To oset this initial discount, the expected rental rate at the second adjustment period will
be higher on the upward-only adjusting lease (owing to the rent 
oor). The relationship
between the expected rental rates at the rst adjustment date is uncertain: the rent 
oor
will tend to make the rental rate on the upward-only lease higher, but the lower initial
rental rate will make it lower. As is shown in column (12) of Table 2, for drifts of 5 to 10
percent these two forces precisely oset; for lower drifts, the rent-
oor impact dominates
the lower initial-rent impact.
4.1 Impact of Service Flow Drift () and Volatility ()
The initial rent discount on the upward-only lease will be greater the more likely the rent

oor is to bind, and this likelihood is greater the lower the expected drift and the higher
the expected volatility. Assuming low service 
ow volatility ( = 0:1), the initial discount
falls dramatically from about 12 cents per dollar of service 
ow at zero drift to only 1.5
cents at ve percent drift, to 0.1 cents at a ten percent drift. As the drift increases to the
double digit level, the odds of the rent 
oor binding becomes negligible. The oset to the
low initial rental rate is a higher expected rental rate at the second adjustment date (and
at the rst date with zero expected drift).
With a doubling of expected volatility to 20 percent, the initial discount also roughly
doubles at zero drift. At higher drifts, the increase in the initial discount, while smaller,
9is proportionately far greater, rising from only 0.1 cents to 3 to 4 cents at double digit
drift. Even with high drift, high volatility creates a signicant probability of the rent 
oor
binding.
4.2 Impact of Real Risk-Free Interest Rate (r   )
An increase in the real risk-free rate from one to four percent reduces the upward-only
initial rent discount by 15 to 35 percent. However, the premium by which the expected rent
on the upward-only lease at the second adjustment exceeds that on the up-and-down lease
remains unchanged. With the higher discount rate the unchanged premium is worth less in
present value terms, resulting in the reduced initial rent discount.
4.3 Impact of an Alternative Adjustment Rule
Of course, there are many other possible adjustment indexes for the upward-only lease. For
example, the rent could be adjusted only if the rent on ve-year leases has risen since orig-
ination. This could be labeled the variable-rate adjustment. Or the rent at the adjustment
dates could be adjusted to the rent on a lease of the same remaining maturity (and number
of adjustments), rather than the same original lease term and number of adjustments. That
is, the rent at the rst adjustment period could be adjusted only if the rent on a 10-year
lease with a single adjustment at ve years had risen (the lease has only 10 years of remain-
ing life at this point) and the rent at the second adjustment period could be increased only
if the rent on a ve year lease (the remaining term) has risen. This could be labeled the
term-structure adjustment.
Table 3 compares the upward-only rents calculated under the UK method with the
rents calculated using the term-structure method. As in Section 3, we examine the rental
discounts in low and high drift and volatility environments. The UK and the term-structure
methods produce dramatically dierent rent structures when growth in the rental service

ow is positive because the rents on leases with dierent maturities { the rents to which the
adjustment is occurring { dier so much. For example, when volatility is low ( = 10%)
and growth is high ( = 10%), the initial term-structure rent is almost 10 times the UK
rent. In comparison, the rents at the rst and second adjustments calculated according to
the term-structure rule are signicantly lower than the rents found using the UK rule, only
83% and 67% at the rst and second adjustment dates, respectively. Given that the rents
at the adjustment dates are calculated over 15 years rather than over 10 or 5 years as in
the term-structure method, it is not surprising that the future rents are higher. Because
the model still solves for the equilibrium initial contract rent that equates to the value of
the service 
ow over the lease term, the initial rent in the UK rule method must necessarily
be set very low in order to balance the equation.
10It is interesting to compare the results in Tables 2 and 3. In comparing the rents
determined by the term-structure to the up-or-down adjusting model, we note that the
upward-only rents are signicantly dierent (i.e., the upward-only feature has value) when
expected appreciation () is low or volatility () is high. However, comparing rents calcu-
lated using the UK and the term-structure rules, we see that when expected appreciation
() is low or volatility () is high, dierences between the rents decline. In fact, when
 = 0 the rents are equal. This suggests that during periods when the upward-only feature
has the greatest impact on rent calculations ( = 0), the dierences between UK and the
term-structure rules are minimal. However, during periods of high appreciation when the
term-structure option pricing model indicates that the upward-only feature has little value
over the fully indexed lease, the UK adjustment mechanism indicates that the upward-only
feature has dramatic consequences on rent calculations.
We probably cannot over emphasize this point. Historically, UK (London) capital-
ization rates have been far lower than those on the continent and the US. The primary cause
of this is the structure of the UK institutional lease, not so much the upward-only feature,
but the adjustment to a rental rate based on a constant 15-year (formerly 25-year) term.
Initial rents, and thus capitalization rates, must be extraordinarily low to compensate for
this hyper drift.
5 Time Dependent Drift: Pricing When a Market is Ex-
pected to Collapse.
In this section we generalize the model to include time dependence in the instantaneous
drift (t). Real estate supply and demand often adjust in lumpy increments re
ecting the
completion of new buildings or rm expansion/contractions. While anticipated changes in
real estate supply are readily observable and thus re
ected in market rents, rm demand
for real estate (either contraction or expansion) is not as readily observed. Moreover, one
can reasonably project short-term periods of increasing or decreasing demand periodically
during the cycle. By incorporating time dependence into the model, we are able to examine
the pricing of a lease during a wide variety of potential economic conditions. We illustrate
the sensitivity of this pricing when a market collapse is anticipated.
To incorporate time dependent drift, we assume that the value of the asset's service

ow obeys the stochastic dynamics
dS(t) = (t)S(t)dt + S(t)dw(t) (20)
11with the solution to (20) given by











(s)ds. The equilibrium contract rent is calculated following the discus-
sion in Sections 2 and 3. For example, in the case of two upward-only adjustments, we
calculate the initial equilibrium rent Ru(0) by (14), where Ru(T) and Ru(2T) are given by










Thus, we can solve (14) (with (15) and (16) replaced by (22) and (23), respectively) numer-
ically for alternative (t) functions.
We utilize the time dependent drift feature to price a market collapse followed by a
sharp rebound. We assume that the real service 
ow is expected to fall at a ve percent rate
during the rst ve years, rebound at a ve percent real rate during the second ve years,
and be 
at thereafter. The expected nominal service 
ow also depends on the underlying
expected rate of in
ation. We consider the case of ve percent in





0 if t 2 [0;5)
0:1 if t 2 [5;10)
0:05 if t 2 [10;25]:
As always, we normalize S0 to unity.
Table 4 compares the rents when a market collapse is expected with those expected
assuming a steady state ve percent growth rate. Under either the one or four percent
real interest rate and volatility of 10 or 20 percent, the value of the lease declines by eight
percent in response to the expected temporary shortfall of the service 
ow. With the
expected collapse, the initial contract rent declines by a third (one percent real rate) to a
quarter (four percent real rate) irrespective of the volatility level. The expected rent in ve
years is about ve percent less, and that in ten years is only one percent less. These results
are not sensitive to either the level of real interest rates or volatility.
126 Computing Eective Rents When Free Rent Periods Are
Given
During the early 1990s the London oce market collapsed, and free rent periods rose from
negligible amounts to three years (Hendershott, Lizieri and Matysiak, 1999). This created
problems for time-series modeling of rent determination: just how does one make rents where
free rent periods are given comparable to rents when free rent periods do not exist? Put
another way, how should one calculate the \eective" rent (zero free rent period equivalent)
from the quoted \face" rent and free rent periods?
Two simple conversion rules that have been advanced are illustrated in Figure 1,
where rent is on the vertical axis and time is on the horizontal (Crosby and Murdoch,
1994). The quoted or face rent is A, but it is not paid until the fourth year. After the fth
year, the rent is uncertain because of the upward-only adjustment; rents may continue at
A or may be higher if market rents have risen suciently.
The rst rule for converting face rents to eective (zero free rent periods) rent is to
compute the rent that will give the same present value of rents over the ve years to the
rst adjustment. This is indicated by B in the gure. This rule almost certainly gives too
low a rent. If rent at the adjustment date is less than A, the lease with free rent periods
would earn greater rent during the second ve year period than the lease without free rent
periods. Thus the correct or indierent eective rent is greater than B. The second rule is
to select the rent that will give the same present value of rents over the entire 15-year life
of the lease. This is indicated by C. This rule almost certainly gives too high a value. If
market rent at either the rst or second adjustment date exceeds C, the gap between the
rent earned on the lease with free rent periods and that without will shrink relative to that
in the gure, and the present value of rents on the lease without free periods will tend to
be greater than that with free rent periods.
Given our  specication, we can compute the initial rent with or without free rent
periods. We rst compute the value of the service 
ow using equation (1). We then compute
the initial rent without free rent, using equations (12)-(13). Finally, we modify equation
(14), changing the rst term to re
ect the free rent period. The results are shown in Table
5 for ve percent in
ation during both steady state and collapsed markets. We note that
the initial rent is greater with free rent periods the lower the volatility and the lower the
real interest rate. The reverse is true for the rent at the adjustment periods. With free rent,
the 
oor is higher and thus the rent in later years is likely to be higher. And the higher
the 
oor, the more likely are the higher later rents. With the collapsed market, the lower is
the initial rent and thus the less likely is the 
oor to bind and the lower is the rent in later
years.
Table 6 compares the discount of the quoted face rent required to get the eective
rent using our model and using the simple 5-year and 15-year rules. Given our assumptions,
13when the underlying in
ation rate is ve percent, the correct discount is about 60 percent
(column 1). The discount is two to four percentage points less when the market is collapsing
than when it is steady, and the discount is about three percentage points less at the higher
real interest rate than the lower and at the higher volatility than the lower. With the
collapsed market (zero expected service-
ow growth during the rst ve years) or higher
volatility, the more likely the higher face rent is to create a binding 
oor at the adjustment
date. The higher discount rate lowers the initial rent discount because the impact of a
binding 
oor in the out years is less.
The second and third columns give the discount that is implied by the simple 5 and
15 year amortization rules. Because of their simplicity, the discounts are independent of
either expected volatility in future service 
ow or in the state of the market. Columns four
and ve show the errors caused by the simple rules. Column four is the ratio of column
two to column one. It is unity plus the percentage overstatement in the discount. As can
be seen, the percentage overstatement in the steady state market using the 5-year rule is
ve to 20 percent, with the overstatement being greater the larger is volatility and the
higher the real discount rate. The overstatement of the discount caused by the ve year
rule is far less than the 40 to 60 percent understatement caused by the 15-year rule. The
overstatement of the ve year rule will be greater at lower underlying in
ation rates, while
the understatement of the 15-year rule will be less.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we develop an implicit equation for securities with path dependent cash 
ows
and apply it to the upward-only adjusting lease. Our model is in the spirit of Grenadier
(1996) and correctly calculates the expected rents at the rst and second adjustment dates
taking into account the asset service 
ow expected growth and volatility. Our ndings
indicate that the initial rent on upward-only leases should be signicantly lower than that
on a corresponding fully adjusting leases when the rent 
oor is likely to bind (when the
expected drift in the service 
ow is low and volatility is high). This discount osets the
expected increase in rents at the adjustment dates. As expected, the higher the expected
growth rate and the lower the volatility, the lower the discount.
We extend the model to examine the initial rent discount in dierent economic
environments. Specically, we compare the expected rents in a market expecting a recession
to be followed by an expansion. Results indicate how equilibrium rents need to be set so as
to re
ect these expected conditions.
We also examine rent setting when free rent periods are given or show how to convert
the face rents with free rent periods to equivalent eective rents without free rent periods.
14We show the importance of allowing for the impact of the higher face rents accompanying
the free rent periods on the rent 
oor at the future adjustment dates. The errors introduced
by using two conversion rules, amortizing the free rent periods over the period to the rst
rent adjustment at the fth year and over the full 15-year term of the lease. The former
slightly overstates the eective rent calculation, whereas the latter greatly understates it.
While the model presented here captures the spirit of the upward-only adjusting
process, the present model can be extended in a number of directions. First, the upward-
only adjustment should be incorporated in the market rent index to which the contract
adjusts. Second, other tenant options should be added, namely \break" or cancellation
clauses as well as the option to default on the lease payments. Such additions will provide
a much richer picture of the adjustment process and pricing associated with this contract.
15Appendix
Recall, the expected contract rent at 2T is dened in (16) as
Ru(2T) = E [max[Ru(T);(2T)]]
where
(T) =  1ew(T)
(2T) =  2ew(2T):
and
 1  e 2T=2g(r   ;T;4T)=g(r;T;4T)
 2  e 22T=2g(r   ;2T;5T)=g(r;2T;5T):
Because the joint probability density function, p(x;y;T;2T), of the random variable






































dt, it follows that the expected rent,
Ru(2T), is given by



























































































If we denote the right hand side of equation (14) in the text as 	2(Ru(0)), then to
have a positive solution we must have
	2(0) < g(r   ;0;3T):








































dt, and  1 and  2 are dened above.
Thus, 	2(0) is a function of 6 variables, (r;;;T;2T;3T), and the condition under which
17equation (14) has a positive solution for the value of the initial contract rent depends on
values taken by these arguments.7
7Under certain conditions the general equilibrium framework underlying our model does not contain a
solution for R
u(0). Specically, when  is much greater than r (when real interest rates are quite negative),
no solution exists. For example, when  = 10% and r = 6%,  must be greater than 100% for no solution
to exist.
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19Table 1: Term-Structure of Rents
10-year
15-year Leases at Lease at 5-year Leases at
r     Year 0 Year 5 Year 10 Year 5 Year 0 Year 5 Year 10
0.01 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
0.01 0.05 1.408 1.808 2.322 1.625 1.129 1.450 1.861
0.01 0.1 1.896 3.127 5.155 2.587 1.268 2.091 3.447
0.04 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
0.04 0.05 1.370 1.760 2.259 1.605 1.126 1.445 1.856
0.04 0.1 1.800 2.967 4.892 2.525 1.260 2.078 3.426
2
0Table 2: Equilibrium Rents Calculated for the Upward-Only and Up-or-Down Adjusting Leases
Upward-Only Rents Up-or-Down Rents Upward-Only
and Up-or-Down
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
r      Y Ru
2(0) Ru
2(5) Ru
2(10) Year 0 Year 5 Year 10 Year 0 Year 5 Year 10
0.01 0 0.1 13.93 0.867 1.033 1.113 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.133 0.033 0.113
0.01 0.05 0.1 13.93 0.594 1.808 2.352 0.611 1.808 2.322 -0.017 0.000 0.030
0.01 0.1 0.1 13.93 0.101 3.127 5.159 0.102 3.127 5.155 -0.001 0.000 0.004
0.04 0 0.1 11.28 0.889 1.040 1.118 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.112 0.040 0.118
0.04 0.05 0.1 11.28 0.749 1.760 2.289 0.761 1.760 2.259 -0.012 0.000 0.029
0.04 0.1 0.1 11.28 0.456 2.967 4.895 0.457 2.967 4.892 -0.001 0.000 0.004
0.01 0 0.2 13.93 0.745 1.058 1.221 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.255 0.058 0.221
0.01 0.05 0.2 13.93 0.521 1.809 2.485 0.611 1.808 2.322 -0.090 0.000 0.163
0.01 0.1 0.2 13.93 0.063 3.127 5.272 0.102 3.127 5.155 -0.039 0.000 0.117
0.04 0 0.2 11.28 0.785 1.073 1.232 1.000 1.000 1.000 -0.215 0.073 0.232
0.04 0.05 0.2 11.28 0.694 1.763 2.420 0.761 1.760 2.259 -0.067 0.003 0.160
0.04 0.1 0.2 11.28 0.430 2.967 5.003 0.457 2.967 4.892 -0.027 0.000 0.111
Note: Up-or-Down Rents are calculated using the Grenadier term structure approach (with contract values equal).
2
1Table 3: Comparison of Upward-only Adjusting Lease Rents Calculated According to the Term Structure
and the UK Methods
Ratio of
Term-Structure Method UK Method to
Term-Structure Method
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
r      Y Ru
2(0) Ru
2(5) Ru
2(10) Year 0 Year 5 Year 10
0.01 0 0.1 13.93 0.867 1.033 1.113 1 1 1
0.01 0.05 0.1 13.93 0.963 1.626 1.926 0.617 1.112 1.221
0.01 0.1 0.1 13.93 0.971 2.587 3.478 0.104 1.209 1.483
0.04 0 0.1 11.28 0.889 1.04 1.118 1 1 1
0.04 0.05 0.1 11.28 0.998 1.607 1.916 0.75 1.095 1.194
0.04 0.1 0.1 11.28 1.032 2.525 3.452 0.442 1.175 1.418
0.01 0 0.2 13.93 0.745 1.058 1.221 1 1 1
0.01 0.05 0.2 13.93 0.867 1.644 2.077 0.601 1.1 1.196
0.01 0.1 0.2 13.93 0.911 2.589 3.656 0.069 1.208 1.442
0.04 0 0.2 11.28 0.785 1.073 1.232 1 1 1
0.04 0.05 0.2 11.28 0.919 1.632 2.069 0.754 1.08 1.169
0.04 0.1 0.2 11.28 0.988 2.53 3.619 0.435 1.173 1.382
2
2Table 4: Equilibrium Rents Calculated for the Upward-Only Adjusting Lease Assuming an Expected Market
Collapse
Ratio of
Steady-State Market Collapsed Market Collapsed Market to
Steady-State Market
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)






2(10) Year 0 Year 5 Year 10
0.01 0.05 0.1 13.93 0.594 1.808 2.352 12.833 0.4 1.735 2.342 0.674 0.959 0.996
0.04 0.05 0.1 11.28 0.749 1.76 2.289 10.333 0.572 1.676 2.278 0.764 0.952 0.995
0.01 0.05 0.2 13.93 0.521 1.809 2.485 12.833 0.336 1.735 2.459 0.645 0.959 0.989
0.04 0.05 0.2 11.28 0.694 1.763 2.42 10.333 0.526 1.676 2.389 0.759 0.951 0.987
2
3Table 5: Equilibrium Rents Calculated for the Upward-Only Adjusting Leases Assuming Free Rent Oered
During the First 3 Years.
Ratio of
No Free Rent Period 3-years Free Rent Free Rent and
No Free Rent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)






2(0) Year 0 Year 5 Year 10
Panel A: Steady-State Market
0.01 0.05 0.1 13.93 0.594 1.808 2.352 1.516 1.854 2.367 2.553 1.025 1.006
0.04 0.05 0.1 11.28 0.749 1.76 2.289 1.778 1.927 2.352 2.375 1.095 1.028
0.01 0.05 0.2 13.93 0.521 1.809 2.485 1.228 1.879 2.524 2.358 1.039 1.016
0.04 0.05 0.2 11.28 0.694 1.763 2.42 1.528 1.949 2.531 2.203 1.105 1.046
Panel B: Collapsed Market
0.01 0.05 0.1 12.83 0.4 1.735 2.342 1.093 1.737 2.343 2.731 1.001 1
0.04 0.05 0.1 10.33 0.572 1.676 2.278 1.468 1.745 2.296 2.567 1.041 1.008
0.01 0.05 0.2 12.83 0.336 1.735 2.459 0.88 1.75 2.467 2.618 1.009 1.003
0.04 0.05 0.2 10.33 0.526 1.676 2.389 1.264 1.779 2.444 2.402 1.061 1.023
2
4Table 6: Comparison of Correct Discount of Quoted Face Rent to Obtain Eective Rent and Simple
Conversion Rules














Panel A: Steady-State Market
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.608 0.636 0.278 1.045 0.456
0.04 0.05 0.1 0.579 0.653 0.319 1.128 0.552
0.01 0.05 0.2 0.576 0.636 0.278 1.104 0.482
0.04 0.05 0.2 0.546 0.653 0.319 1.196 0.585
Panel B: Collapsed Market
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.634 0.636 0.278 1.003 0.438
0.04 0.05 0.1 0.610 0.653 0.319 1.070 0.523
0.01 0.05 0.2 0.618 0.636 0.278 1.028 0.449
0.04 0.05 0.2 0.584 0.653 0.319 1.119 0.547
*Unity less the ratio of columns 5 and 8 in Table 5.
**Discount given by the 5 year rule. Note that it is independent of volatility and the state of the market.
***Discount given by the 15 year rule.
****Unity plus the percentage overstatement of the discount caused by using the 5 year rule.








Figure 1: Rules for Converting Face Rents (A) 
into Effective Rents (B and C)
 